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While the Chinese liberalized their economy and created a brand new labor market scarcely 
fifteen years ago, they have relied on their pre-existing institutions, including government-
affiliated trade unions, to provide a structure for labor-management relations.  As industrial 
conflict has risen along with privatization and increasingly competitive markets, the Chinese 
government seems to have come to recognize the importance of transforming their old industrial 
relations system to adapt to these market changes.  This transformation requires abandoning the 
“transmission-belt” model that dates back to the days of the planned economy, which primarily 
advanced the Communist Party’s program, but at the same time most of the evidence suggests 
that worker-interest representation remains a joint function of the Party and institutions 
cooperating with it.  Recent changes in both law and practice provide evidence of their serious 
interest in creating an industrial relations system, while attempting to avoid the risk of social and 
political destabilization, but direct social and institutional change in China requires careful 
testing to determine both the efficacy of new approaches and to see whether it endangers the 
social and political stability that the government wants. 
This paper looks at a number of experiments in Chinese industrial relations to determine the 
extent to which economic and organizational changes have occurred in recent years.  We focus 
on community union developments in Changchun that are aimed at organizing employees of 
 small enterprises previously considered outside the boundaries for Chinese labor unions.  We 
also discuss cases in other provinces in which local unions have taken the initiative to organize 
migrant workers in a way that foreshadows changes in the Chinese legal corpus that we think 
empowers unions to take hitherto unheard of if not impermissible actions on behalf of migrant 
and otherwise dispossessed workers. We give special attention to the extent to which contingent 
labor relationships have grown in importance in China and to the challenge these relationships 
present to unions responsible for maintaining harmonious workplace relationships. Certain 
changes in practice, including the new Labor Contract Law, may provide a vehicle with which to 
develop a Chinese industrial relations system better able to balance equity with efficiency and 
achieve the government’s goal of “harmonious society” (?谐?会? (Xinhua News Agency 
2005).  We find that incremental industrial relations reform continues to occur in many areas of 
China, particularly where product and labor markets have transformed relationships between 
workers – especially migrant peasant workers (nongmingong, or “farmers-turned-workers”) 
newly integrating into the industrial and market economy – and employers.   
This trend becomes particularly salient when considering the compensation packages 
offered to workers – especially nongmingong – who make up a large share of China’s growing 
working class. While the problem exists throughout China, Guandong and other southern 
provinces are replete with private entrepreneurs who have taken advantage of the development of 
the market to hire migrant workers and others who work without the benefit of union 
representation and often without the benefit even of the individual labor contract required by law.   
Here one finds some of the most exploited workers in China and one key locus for new union 
activity designed to put the brakes on these practices.  The Labor Contract Law seems to be 
tailor-made to support many of the Chinese unions’ new innovative organizing and 
representational activities. 
Theoretical considerations 
Many Chinese scholars and policy leaders believe industrial relations is China’s most 
critical challenge, and their need to develop a research agenda in industrial relations is urgent.  
Industrial relations problems lie at the heart of current high-profile issues such as the generally 
growing inequality produced by the rapid shift to market governance, and the growing reliance 
on labor markets in particular to regulate China’s economic development.  Unregulated markets 
 tend to promote greater inequality as the consequences of liberalization, deregulation, and 
deinstitutionalization ripple out to labor markets (Belman and Belzer 1997).  Markets may 
overwhelm institutions (Belzer 2000), and when the changing balance between markets and 
institutions destabilizes, markets may become the dominant institution governing social and 
economic relations until the imbalance provokes a socially and politically destabilizing backlash 
from workers (Taylor, Chang Kai, and Li Qi 2003), a phenomenon that appears to concern the 
Chinese government. Inequality in China has now reached the level of that in the United States, 
which is far greater than that of most industrialized countries. 
 Starting with the three objectives of the employment relationship – efficiency, equity, and 
voice (Budd 2004) – we assess the effectiveness of existing and developing Chinese labor 
institutions.  We test the extent to which the industrial relations system is performing effectively 
by looking at the distribution of employment outcomes such as wages, benefits, and working 
conditions.  We look across several sectors in the Chinese economy as well as several forms and 
structures of ownership, since outcomes appear to vary across these dimensions much the same 
as they vary by industry, market, and firm size elsewhere in market-driven economies.  We also 
look at specific experiments in industrial relations that currently are underway in China, and 
which constitute concrete efforts – inside or outside the confines of the current law – to attempt 
to close the equity gap.  These innovations represent strategic choices on the part of relatively 
local unions to address these problems as they emerge in their areas.  We interpret Chinese 
industrial relations using the three-tier model proposed by Kochan, Katz, and McKersie (Kochan 
and Katz 1988; Kochan, Katz, and McKersie 1986; Kochan et al. 2008). 
We have developed some skepticism, however, about whether the concept of voice as 
understood by the International Labor Organization (ILO) (Budd 2004) should have as much 
weight as equity and efficiency in assessing the balance essential for an effective east Asian 
labor-management relationship.  The voice concept that westerners maintain is one steeped in the 
tradition of power conflicts and disputation (Nisbett 2003), something for which the tradition in 
China is controversial and perhaps even weak. The 2,500-year-old philosophy of Daoism (??; 
transliterated also as “Taoism”), for example, considers disputation to be a waste of energy that 
promotes disharmony, while Confucian tradition, of similar age and perhaps even more 
pervasive reach, promotes the kind of respect for authority that discourages disputes (Mair 1998).  
 Although we do not shrink from embracing the ILO’s pluralist notion of voice, we simply are not 
sure whether we should consider it as important in China as the very measurable outcome of 
equity.  On that score, China is not doing well and being tied with the United States for 
inequality is not an enviable situation (Central Intelligence Agency 2007b, 2007a); the United 
States leads the industrial world on that dimension.  
In addition, we think the State plays a stronger role, in Asia in general and China in 
particular, than the prevailing industrial relations models provide.  In an Asian corporatist state 
such as China, the State is not just an honest broker but also an active agent with a substantial 
property interest.  The Chinese State continues to act as a major investor, even as privatization of 
government-owned firms, privately owned firms, and the market development process proceeds 
unabated.  Industrial relations models that work in China must therefore account for the 
government’s equity interest as well as its regulatory functions.  Although the State does not 
have a direct investment in the small private firms that are the focus of this study, one could 
argue that given the competitive implications inherent in the new product and labor markets 
generated by the marketization process, the actions of these private-sector employers will have 
equity implications for state-owned and state-invested firms at many levels.    
In addition, the lines that separate the government, the union, the company management, 
and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) are blurred (Gallagher 2005).  Party officials may 
represent the interests of the government, the union, or management, and the union itself is part 
of the government.  In this very strong corporatist state environment, the question for industrial 
relations may be less a question of formal voice mechanisms and more whether the workers 
generally are better off because of the influence of the Union and, by inference, the State.  In 
sum, the Chinese State is not merely the mediator between business and labor interests, but it is 
an active stakeholder as well as a property-holder. 
For these reasons and for this analysis, we propose to modify the well-known “three-tier 
model” to include three parties, rather than the usual two, within the box that incorporates the 
strategic, functional, and workplace loci of activity (Kochan et al. 2008).  In the western liberal 
pluralist tradition, the State plays a relatively weak and outsider role as a regulator and primarily 
acts as an external environmental influence. The Union in China is a paradoxical institution; it 
plays a complex role as a major functional activity of the CCP as well as a governmental 
 institution in a structure in which the State itself may have a property interest.  In China, while 
the State operates in the industrial relations environment and plays an outsider role, it also acts as 
an active participant at all three levels and therefore must be included as an active participant.   
Finally, we assess the value systems operating at the core of the Chinese industrial relations 
system.  While Budd and others successfully introduce business ethics into industrial relations 
(Budd 2004; Bowie 2005; Wheeler 2005; Budd and Scoville 2005; Kaufman 2005), the ethical 
systems generally are western (Scoville, Lawler, and Xiang Yi 2005).  We seek to understand 
Chinese industrial relations from a Chinese – and particularly Confucian and Mohist – 
philosophical and ethical perspective (Lin Mousheng 1942; de Bary and Tu Weiming 1997; 
Zhang Dainian 2002). 
This perspective requires the society to behave and the government to rule according to 
“heaven’s will” (Mozi (??) 2006), acting in an ethical manner that rises above property stake-
holding and rules on behalf of the common good.  Individual welfare depends on the state (and 
the emperor) acting with righteousness and not merely on behalf of what we today might call 
“special interests.”  While problems of corruption pervade Chinese society (Sun Yan 2004), it 
becomes exceptionally important for a strong state to “rule from heaven” because historically, 
that has been the source of the emperor’s legitimacy (Fairbank 1978).  Further, not only did 
Mèngzǐ (a.k.a. Mèng Zǐ, Meng Tzu, and Mencius), a Confucian moral scholar, emphasize the 
importance of ruling from heaven, he argued that the “people were the litmus test for the 
‘awesome mandate to rule from Heaven.” (Junjie Huang 2001)1.  The active role of the State 
therefore is qualitatively different from the western standard, which requires the State merely to 
act as an honest broker between private interests.  In China, the State fundamentally has a 
different relationship to its citizens.  
Western political theory, at least, would suggest that a lack of worker voice would 
contribute to growing economic inequality in a pluralist, competitive market environment, and 
that growing inequality will contribute to social and political instability. Others, notably Taylor, 
Chang and Li (2003; last chapter), also point out that Chinese have revolted repeatedly and 
frequently throughout Chinese history against unrequited demands for equity (as implied by the 
                                                
 
1 “Heaven sees with the eyes of its people.  Heaven hears with the ears of its people.”  
 perspective of Mèngzǐ above), so it seems fair to hypothesize that a lack of equity and voice in 
China today will eventually lead to instability.  We therefore propose to test the effectiveness of 
the Chinese industrial relations system against this theory. 
The shift from institutions to markets 
Much has been said about the decline of the state-owned firm (Warner 2004; Yi Zhang and 
Xi Li 2006), but our research suggests that the state-owned firm is alive and well, and prospering 
greatly during the current and ongoing boom (Saxton 2005) 2, even as its relative share of the 
economy has declined.  It generally is true that industrial relations structures and strategies 
mirror the structure and strategy of any nation’s firms, and this is especially important in China 
because the state has a property-holding stake in a substantial number of firms.  While in western 
countries – especially in corporatist political economies – the state has a stake in industrial 
relations outcomes, the web of government ownership throughout the firm and its subsidiaries is 
so overwhelming in China that industrial relations models built on the assumption that 
government plays a mediating role between employers and employees (and their unions) will fail 
to capture the important effects of state action.  This has been especially true insofar as the All 
China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU), as well as its member unions at all levels, has acted 
as an arm of the State and the Party. 
Private-sector firms, however, present special challenges to the Chinese government.  With 
legal and political institutions still premised on state-control of enterprises, and on a strong state, 
privately held firms tend to escape the normal institutional framework that provides legal 
oversight. In this environment, mechanisms that ensure that employers conform to legal 
requirements are absent, and individuals must seek enforcement or redress by filing individual 
arbitration cases and court cases.  This process is intimidating and expensive, and the individual 
nature of the complaint creates an overwhelming strain on the institutions. 
Furthermore, much of the theory that defines the role of the unions was based on public 
ownership of firms.  Perhaps the clearest example is the earliest modern labor law, the law 
governing “Industrial Enterprises Owned by the Whole People”, which provided for the 
Workers’ Representative Assembly (Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress 
                                                
 
2 The Fortune Global 500 in 2006 listed nineteen of China’s state-owned enterprises 
(http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/global500/2006/countries/C.html).  
 1988).  Although the law is applicable only to state-owned firms, it provides what theoretically 
would be the highest order of popular sovereignty over the workplace, similar conceptually to 
the works councils of Europe but more advisory in practice.  It provides no guidance, 
unfortunately, for the effort to provide representation for individual workers who find themselves 
working under individual contracts that the may undercut national legal standards, or working 
under no legal contract at all. 
The fundamental value governing the mixed-motive unionized relationship in China, the 
notion that the company and the union “have the same fate” and the union and the members have 
the “same heart”,3 becomes stretched to the breaking point when the firm is privately held and 
hires migrant workers under dubious circumstances, frequently not paying them at all for they 
work they perform for months at a time (2005).  Although the union represents the interests of 
the workers, in China it also must incorporate the interests of the firm as well.  In firms that 
abuse or fail to pay their workers, however, or that fail to sign legal employment contracts with 
them, the union and the company cannot be of the same heart.  These kinds of firms are the 
target of this new labor contract law and some of the innovations in labor relations in China 
designed to take concrete steps to use the unions to gain greater equity for workers. 
While China’s “market economy with socialist character” has resulted in China’s current 
status as a “global factory” (2002), China’s success has caught the attention of the world.  Not 
only has China become a national “factory” that produces labor-intensive products, but it also 
has gradually entered quality production markets that rely on intensive skills and capital in the 
production process.  Along with the development of the market economy, steady growth also has 
created an estimated 200 million consumers4.  For almost two decades, China’s economic growth 
rate has averaged 9.8% annually (see Table 1) and this pace of growth continues.  Market 
reforms have gained momentum and it appears that there is no way to return back to the old days, 
characterized by a strict, rigid, state-dominated planned economy.  At the same time, rough spots 
still lie ahead. 
This rapid development has brought with it new challenges.  China must quickly create the 
                                                
 
3 Interview with General Secretary of Big Auto on November 20, 2006. 
4 A popular saying in China today is that market reform has cultivated a middle and rich class of 200 million people.  
Notwithstanding the growing middle class, 1,100 million people in China still live in poverty.  This disparity in 
wealth suggests that China has two very distinguished consumer markets as well as two distinct labor markets. 
 kind of elaborate institutional framework that developed nations have built over hundreds of 
years.  Developed nations know that their labor relations systems should balance efficiency, 
equity, and voice (Budd 2004), channeling the energies and activities of their entrepreneurial 
leaders while maintaining a balance between the countervailing rights and responsibilities of 
business leaders and employees.  Developing nations like China need to pay special attention to 
these issues because the patterns of relationship between workers and managers are particularly 
new and fragile; class conflict can destabilize the country and damage the development process. 
???  ????GDP?????  1960-2005 
Table 1. China’s Average Annual Real GDP Growth Rates, 1960-2005 
?? ????? 
Period Average Annual Growth Rate 
1960-1978 
(????? pre-reform) 
5.3 
1979-2004 
(????? post-reform) 
9.3 
1990 3.8 
1991 9.3 
1992 14.2 
1993 14.0 
1994 13.1 
1995 10.9 
1996 10.0 
1997 9.3 
1998 7.8 
1999 7.6 
2000 8.4 
2001 8.3 
2002 9.1 
2003 10.0 
2004 10.1 
2005 9.9 
2006 (first quarter) 10.2 
Average since 1990 9.8 
Source: (Morrison 2006) 
The rapid pace of economic, institutional, and technological change has its own 
destabilizing dynamic and may constitute its own threat.  Labor disputes are increasing in 
frequency and intensity, and the existing labor dispute resolution mechanism, arbitration, cannot 
keep up with this growing unrest (Table 2).  
 ???????????????  1994-2003 
Table 2: Workers Involved in Labor Disputes in China 1994?2003 
? ?????
????? 
???
?? 
?????
??? 
????
? 
???????????
?? 
Year Collective 
Disputes 
(workers)5 
Annual 
Growth 
Rate 
All Disputes 
(workers) 
Annual 
Growth 
Rate 
Worker involvement in 
collective disputes (percent 
of all disputes) 
1994 52,637  77,794  67.7% 
1995 77,340 46.9% 122,512 57.5% 63.1% 
1996 92,203 19.2% 189,120 54.4% 48.8% 
1997 132,647 43.9% 221,115 16.9% 60.0% 
1998 251,268 89.4% 358,531 62.1% 70.1% 
1999 319,241 27.1% 473,957 32.2% 67.4% 
2000 259,445 -18.7% 422,617 -10.8% 61.4% 
2001 287,000 10.6% 467,000 10.5% 61.5% 
2002 374,956 30.6% 608,396 30.3% 61.6% 
2003 515,000 37.3% 800,000 31.5% 64.4% 
????Source:  
• ????????? Lau Dong Ji She Hui Bao Zhnag Nien Bao Labor and Social Security 
Annual Report (2003) 
The causes of labor disputes, however, are not terribly mysterious.  In China, as in 
developed countries, most labor disputes revolve around wages and benefits, labor protection, 
and change or termination of the labor contract (discharges and other post-hoc alterations).  
These are rather ordinary but salient issues in a country in which inequality has increased 
dramatically as the middle and wealthy urban classes have benefited from development, while 
workers and peasants have fallen behind (Table 3).  
                                                
 
5 Collective disputes are legal disputes involving three or more workers.  They are filed formally with the local 
Ministry of Labor and Social Security.  They are not strikes, which would be recorded elsewhere as “collective 
events.” 
 ??????????? ??????????  
Table 3:?Causes for Labor Disputes 1997?2003 ?
?? ???
??? 
????
???? 
??? 
??
?? 
????
??? 
???
? 
?????
????? 
??? 
???
? 
???
? 
??? 
???
??
Year Total 
Cases 
Wage, 
Insurance, 
Benefit 
?%) Labor 
Protection 
?%? Change or 
termination 
of contract 
?%? Other 
causes 
?%??
1997 71,524 41,145 57.5 2,256 3.2 18,673 26.1 9,450 13.2 
1998 93,649 51,602 55.1 6,931 7.4 20,661 22.1 14,455 15.4 
1999 120,191 73,522 61.2 7,820 6.5 29,608 24.6 9,241 7.7 
2000 135,206 73,021 54.0 13,008 9.6 35,794 26.5 13,383 9.9 
资?来? Source? 
1998?2003???国劳动统计?鉴 Zhong Guo Lau Dong Tong Ji Nien Jian, (China Labor 
Statistics Annual Bulletin)? 
?2003 劳动争议???续?长 “Labor Disputes Continue Growing.”???? 国劳动??会?
?报 Lau Dong Ji She Hui Bao Zhnag , China Labor and Social Security News, March 9, 2004?
?2004?3?9???(2004) 
Finally, the industrial relations dispute resolution mechanism on which China has relied 
with some success in past years appears to be failing.  A system created more than fifteen years 
ago as China was just beginning to develop a labor market as well as a focus on the foreign 
direct investment that would propel its growth (Gallagher 2002), labor arbitration was a kind of 
planning approach to market development and reflected an internal struggle within the 
Communist Party over the balance between market reforms and central planning (Johnston 2002).  
As Table 4 shows, disputes subjected to the existing mediation and arbitration systems have 
increased, but the system has become less, rather than more efficient.  A rapidly growing number 
of disputes fail mediation and go to arbitration, burdening the system.  While workers win a 
majority of these formal disputes, those who fail increasingly turn to the courts.  The burden on 
both systems has increased while a system of efficient industrial dispute resolution has been 
elusive (Gallagher and Dong BaoHua 2008). 
 ???1997?2003????????????????
Table 4.  Methods of Labor Dispute Resolution 1997-2003 
??? ? ? ? ?
????
???? Mediation? ???? Arbitration? ? ? ? ?  Other 
Methods?
Year Total No. of 
Cases 
Resolved 
??
????
???
??
??
????
????
?%??
??
????
???
??
    Number 
of Cases 
?%?? Number 
of Cases 
Percentage Number 
of Cases 
?%??
1997 70,792 32,793 46.3 15,060 21.3 22,939 32.4 
1998 92,288 31,483 34.1 25,389 27.5 35,155 38.1 
1999 121,289 39,550 32.6 34,712 28.6 47,027 38.8 
2000 130,688 41,877 32.0 54,142 41.4 34,669 26.6 
2001 150,279 42,933 28.6 72,250 48.1 35,096 23.4 
2002 178,744 50,925 28.5 77,340 43.3 50,479 28.2 
2003 224,000 68,000 30.3 96,000 42.9 60,000 26.8 
???? Source? 
• 1998?2003 ???????????Zhong Guo Lau Dong Tong Ji Nien Jian ,(China 
Labor Statistics Annual Bulletin)? 
• 2003 ’??????????“Labor Disputes Continue Growing.”???? ???????
?? Lau Dong Ji She Hui Bao Zhnag Bao, (China Labor and Social Security News)?2004 
?3?9?? 
Because almost all enterprises had been owned by the workers’ state, and since the 
government considers it inappropriate and illegal for workers to organize unions for 
representation independent of the Communist Party that leads the workers’ state, China only 
recently has had a reason to create collective bargaining institutions.  As the initial post-Mao 
reforms began, the Party leadership initially broke in into two factions, one pro-market and one 
pro-planning.  While the original free-market group collapsed with the decline of Hu Yaobang in 
1987 (particularly when Deng Xiaoping apparently switched sides, alarmed at the unrest 
stimulated by the process), the planners also failed to manage growth with state planning and by 
1992-1993, the contest to set Chinese economic policy shifted back to "state marketeers," who 
wanted to use competition but keep most of the ownership in the hands of the State, and 
“pragmatic planners”, who tended to retain more confidence in planning than in markets 
(Johnston 2002).   
 For half a decade, these two factions contested for power, with statist free-market forces and 
pragmatic planners often issuing conflicting regulations. "The major agencies allied with the free 
marketeer constellation were the State Commission for Restructuring the Economic Systems, the 
State Economic and Trade Commission…. The major bureaucratic allies of the central planners 
were the State Planning Commission and the Ministry of Finance. The major ally of the statist 
marketeers is the State Economic and Trade Commission, whereas the pragmatic planners are 
allied mainly with the Ministry of Labor" (Johnston 2002). The conflict between the statist 
marketeers and the pragmatic planners took shape in the bureaucratic arena as a conflict between 
the State Economic and Trade Commission and the Ministry of Labor (Johnston 2002; Taylor, 
Chang Kai, and Li Qi 2003)  
The Labor Law of 1994 (Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress 1994), 
which took the concept of individual labor contracts developed back in the 1980s, passed as part 
of the pragmatic planners effort’ to regain power. The Ministry of Labor (now known as the 
Ministry of Labor and Social Security [MOLSS] 6) was more closely tied to the planners, and 
tended to prefer centralized institutions like arbitration to decentralized institutions like unions 
might be.  For these and other reasons, the 1994 Labor Law was aimed at regulating labor 
relations in market-driven but state-owned businesses (Gallagher and Dong BaoHua 2008).While 
the All China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU) was part of this coalition, it seems to us that 
the MOL had the stronger hand because the institutions they established favored the labor 
arbitration process that they led.  The two factions, however, were growing closer together. 
In the late 1990s, a strong effort by the statist free-marketers to regain power over the 
planners ultimately led to a conversion of forces and a conversion of perspectives.  As China’s 
growth picked up steam and market pressure became more pervasive, the need to restructure 
state-owned firms became salient.  Market forces now were becoming fully engaged and the 
growth in the privately owned sector began to put sufficient pressure on state-owned firms that 
they were forced to restructure.  This restructuring, combined with the growing private sector for 
which neither the law creating workers’ congresses for the state-owned sector (Standing 
Committee of the National People’s Congress 1988) nor the Labor Law of 1994 (Standing 
                                                
 
6 The MoLSS recently merged with the Ministry of Personnel, and a new Ministry of Human Resource and Social 
Security (MHRSS) was created in March 2008. 
 Committee of the National People’s Congress 2004) were well suited, prompted both increasing 
worker unrest and the dramatic increase in arbitration cases documented in Table 2. 
This introduction of market reforms, as well as entry into the World Trade Organization 
(WTO), has made it necessary for China to reconsider this issue.  With WTO pressures to 
deregulate its industries and remove State protections, Chinese labor relations have experienced 
new stresses.  As State-owned industries have given way to new domestic entrepreneurialism as 
well as to substantial investment by foreign nationals – including those representing trans-
national corporations as well as overseas Chinese business interests as well as Taiwanese 
business investors – many Chinese workers have become more restive and have begun to 
exercise newly found freedom to associate with each other to advance their specific interests.  
The social contract between management, the government, and labor has become less stable, and 
new relationships must be created.  
New Institutions to Deal with Markets? 
Concern has been growing that the existing body of law has not been adequate to balance 
efficiency and equity in the industrial relations system.  Inequality is growing in China and the 
growth of the market model has outstripped the ability of the existing institutions to enforce 
current law and maintain the balance necessary for a “harmonious society.”  Before the 2007 
passage of the Labor Contract Law (Barboza 2006; Jiang Junlu 2007), many companies had 
exploited a loophole in the labor law provisions for individual contracts that allowed them to hire 
workers as individual contractors with or without any employment relationship to them.  Under 
this construct, employers have begun using recruiting or “dispatching” firms that act as labor 
contractors, “selling” these workers to employers who sign individual commercial contracts 
rather than labor contracts; these workers, called “dispatching workers,” have neither an 
employment relationship with the firm that dispatched them nor an employment relationship with 
the firm that employed their labor.  The use of dispatched workers has increased substantially in 
recent years; indeed, in one major city, the use of dispatching workers rose from 20% to 40% in 
just the years from 2002-2004.7   
The Labor Contract Law that passed the National Peoples Congress in June 2007 became 
                                                
 
7 Confidential interview with top-ranking legal expert and labor union official in this city, September 2, 2006. 
 effective January 1, 2008.  While it does not actually provide for true collective bargaining – and 
the existing Collective Agreement Regulation (implemented in 2004) does not provide for 
western-style collective bargaining – it does provide a framework on which the Ministry of 
Labor and Social Security (MoLSS) could base an opinion issued on August 17th 2006, in a joint 
statement with the ACFTU and China Enterprise Confederation/China Enterprise Directors 
Association (CEC/CEDA, the employers’ organization), that promoted regional collective 
contract negotiation.  In areas such as economic development zones, communities, streets, or 
neighborhoods around which gather small and medium sized private firms, the MoLSS 
encouraged unions and employers to negotiate regional collective agreements. This is neither a 
modification of the Labor Union Law nor an invitation for adversarial labor-management 
bargaining, but it did expand the collective agreement regulation (Brown 2006). 
While “collective bargaining” clearly is different in China than it is in the west, by the end 
of 2003 there were 672,900 collective agreements in total, covering 1,214,000 firms and 
103,500,000 employees.  Collective bargaining, conducted by affiliates of the All China 
Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU), has resulted in wage agreements signed by 293,100 firms, 
covering 35,790,000 employees.  Collective agreements have been reached on a regional and 
industrial basis:  135,400 contracts have been negotiated at a regional and industrial level, 
covering 676,700 firms and 36,416,000 employees.  As of the end of 2003, seventeen provinces 
had established related regional laws and regulations regarding collective bargaining. 8  The trend 
to engage in collective bargaining has shifted from just those at traditional state-owned firms to 
non-state-owned firms and restructured enterprises (those that formerly were state-owned but 
now have mixed state and private ownership). 
Collective contracts are rather legalistic, in that they codify the national labor law within the 
contract in much the same way as clauses that introduce U.S. collective bargaining contracts 
state that nothing in the contract should be construed as violating U.S. labor and employment law, 
and that any such clauses shall be considered null and void.  They also are collective contracts 
only insofar as they collect the terms and conditions of individual worker contracts and place 
them in one document. This may seem insignificant, but in the Chinese Continental legal system, 
                                                
 
8 Information on the number of collective agreements was provided in a briefing by the Collective Agreement 
Department of the ACFTU in September 2005. 
 the act of collecting written contracts together may have far-reaching implications (Brown 2006). 
The Labor Contract Law: A New Era or Just More Duct Tape? 
With change in the air, the MoLSS announced a new legislation proposal in March 2006 –
the Labor Contract Law – and sought public opinion and comment for fine-tuning the law.  The 
proposed labor contract law was designed not only to regulate the increasingly liberal labor 
market, but also may have been designed to strengthen the trade unions by delegating to them the 
responsibility for acting as workers’ advocates in the enforcement of Labor Law as well as a 
mandate for collective bargaining (Barboza 2006).  This proposed law, however, kicked up a 
global dust-up.  The American Chamber of Commerce wrote a series of comments on the law 
that sought to alarm Chinese officials; they claimed that these provisions would stifle the 
Chinese economy by discouraging foreign direct investment.  They were concerned about 
several provisions that they believed would result in a return to lifetime employment as well as 
empower unions affiliated with the ACFTU to go far beyond the mediating human resource 
function they previously had (American Chamber of Commerce in Shanghai (AmCham) 2006; 
US China Business Council 2006, 2007).  Labor supporters in the United States and other 
developed western countries responded differently than they had in the past, denouncing the 
comments of global business interests as self-serving, and expressing support for both Chinese 
lawmakers and the ACFTU (Global Labor Strategies 2006, 2007; International Textile Garment 
and Leather Workers’ Federation 2006; Kahn and Barboza 2007; Landsberg 2007).  The debate 
was intense also within China, with leading labor law experts taking opposing views. 
The growth of market relations over the last dozen years has exposed weaknesses in this 
law and the need for substantial modifications, as many new forms of employment – such as 
dispatching workers with an unclear relationship to existing institutions – had become common 
throughout the country.  The Labor Contract Law supercedes the old individual contract 
provisions in the Labor Law, although it does so by strengthening, rather than weakening, 
reliance on individual contracts, while adding a limited responsibility for collective contract 
negotiation to the ACFTU’s portfolio.  While it does not seem that the government is ready yet 
to cut the union loose to enforce Labor Law directly, by giving the union the responsibility of 
getting individual contracts on paper (something that the Labor Law already requires but which 
often does not happen, particularly in southern China), employees and employers will have to set 
 out terms and conditions of employment – rights and obligations – that comply with the law and 
can be enforced by the arbitration and court systems much more readily. The ultimate purpose of 
this change in the legal framework may be to put the brakes on the race to the bottom resulting 
from liberalized employment arrangements.  The CCP may have concluded that the growing 
anarchy in labor markets has given too much power to employers and the government needs to 
engage the ACFTU in this effort to stop the growing inequality of outcomes.  Indeed, one section 
regulates dispatched workers specifically. 
The current resolution of this debate is the result of an internal debate within the ACFTU. 
The ACFTU legal department argued that from the legalistic point view, collective bargaining 
regulation should be separated from individual labor contracts.  The ACFTU collective 
bargaining department has, on the other hand, the responsibility for advancing collective 
bargaining in union settings. The ACFTU leadership decided to add collective contract clauses 
into this new Labor Contract Law for pragmatic reasons. Union strength in collective bargaining 
is still weak in China today, and neither labor nor management can evaluate the relative success 
of collective bargaining so far. In addition, the Labor Dispute Resolution Act has not passed 
either, and decisions that must be made relative to this act depend in part on the success of the 
Labor Contract Law, so evaluation of its effectiveness has not begun.9  New labor laws, such as 
the Labor Dispute Resolution Act, 10 therefore cannot be passed at least for the next few years, so 
the Western way of making collective bargaining work is not possible, at least under current 
conditions.  The ACFTU’s decision to add a collective bargaining clause into the new law, 
therefore, is a pragmatic way to give the union more power to initiate collective bargaining in 
dealing with market practices. 
In sum, China’s concept of collective bargaining system is quite different from that in the 
rest of the world, especially in developed western countries.  In practice, it is not based on 
voluntary “freedom of association” but neither does it have a universal reach as a mere 
transmission belt.  The ACFTU is an important element of the State and the Chairman of the 
                                                
 
9 Personal conversation with Professor Liu Cheng, a professor of law at Shanghai Normal University and a 
government labor law advisor, on December 31, 2006. 
10 Even though a Labor Dispute Mediation and Arbitration Act passed on Dec. 29, 2007, to be promulgated on May 
1, 2008, the major function is to settle individual contract disputes, not the union-led collective disputes.  The labor 
union role in this act is to serve a third-party role as the mediator; the union can also represent individual workers, or 
a group of workers, as the second party in the mediation process.   
 ACFTU also serves as vice-chairman of the National People’s Congress.  It appears to us that 
China intends to ensure that its trade union movement is not “liberalized to death,” as has been 
the case with the reform of institutions governing a similarly state-oriented trade union 
movement in Taiwan.  In the case of Taiwan, liberalization allowed the development of many 
trade union centers and this approach to liberalization may have contributed to the dramatic 
weakening of Taiwan’s trade unions after the introduction of democracy (Pan Shih-Wei 1998, 
2006).  As suggested elsewhere in this paper, strong states are common in Asia and may play a 
critical role in China, as it currently does in Taiwan. 
Experiments and Innovations in Union Activity 
Chinese labor unions have been attempting to deal with growing problem of inequality and 
inequity that the market economy has produced.  It may be fair to hypothesize that they really did 
not know what to expect when they shifted from planning to markets, but the steady drumbeat of 
support for markets coming from western economists and western-trained Chinese economists 
certainly did not prepare them for what they experienced.  The stories from the west mostly have 
been glowing accounts of how markets work to make everyone prosperous.  While markets have 
been successful in the west and while globalization may have produced higher average wealth, 
the failure to distinguish between overall wealth and the distribution of that wealth has not 
prepared the Chinese for the exploding inequality they experienced. 
The earliest example of a migrant peasants union seems to be in Nanjing (Jingsu Province) 
in 2000.  This approach developed because the local union leadership recognized that migrant 
peasant workers were not joining the enterprise unions because they had done at their home 
address (Chinese consider their home towns to be the place where they or their family, and their 
ancestors, originated).  They began to organize them into “community unions” and by June 2000 
they had spread the concept throughout the Nanjing area.  Wuhan (Hubei Province) also 
recognized this problem and followed quickly in Nanjing’s footsteps.  Shenyang followed by 
2001 and the concept was taken up by the union in Beijing as a means for organizing 
construction workers (XinYiyang 2003). 
In Hubei Province, by 2003 the scope of the problem had become clear and on November 1, 
the provincial government announced “the implementation of ‘People's Republic of China 
 Unions Law’ in Hubei Province”, which was a Hubei Province supplement to the Trade Union 
Law of 1992, as approved by the Hubei Province People’s Congress in 1993 and amended in 
2002.  This law, one of the many precursors to the Labor Contract Law, strengthened the union’s 
hand in dealing with the growing disorganization and even fragmentation of the workforce – 
especially with the lack of organization of the nongmingong, which had led to their increased 
exploitation.  The new provincial law gave the union the authority to act as workers’ 
representatives, which was a major policy shift that gave the unions the right to represent, the 
right to advocate on behalf of workers, and the right to sue on their behalf if necessary.  Another 
important feature of the Hubei Model was that it prohibited bosses and their family from serving 
as union officials, it shifted fee collection responsibility from the union to the tax bureau, and it 
provided security from discharge to union presidents (XinYiyang 2003). 
Another key innovation, or experiment, is the development of “community unions.”  These 
are union-type associations that unions establish at the street or block level within city districts.  
They have been implemented by volunteers who call themselves non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) and which concentrate on helping out migrant workers with legal 
problems (helping with labor law and other legal issues), financial problems, and dealing with 
other personal problems.  They almost might be considered grass-roots social work operations in 
some cases (2004) where the original initiative comes from individuals, and may be considered 
unions in others in which a union has taken the lead (Head Union of Chaoyang District 2007; 
XinYiyang 2003; Chen Xiaoyan and Zhang Shibin 2007). 
Finally, in a variant on the community union model, the unions in Changchun, Jilin 
Province, began a program in 2006 to professionalize their community union leaders.  
Recognizing that the community union leader’s job is difficult and requires mature union 
officials who have experience and sufficient education to understand the law and organizational 
concepts to be successful (Li Tianding and Chen Fuming 2007; Lü Lei, Li Jiangang, and Sang 
We 2007; 2007), the union in Changchun set out to hire union presidents and get them out on the 
street to establish unions across a range of small private enterprisese, mostly in the restaurant 
industry, and employing migrant peasant workers. 
 An Experiment to Professionalize Union Presidents in Changchun  
Some degree of uniformity to labor standards has begun to emerge, beginning to change the 
facts on the ground. Although wages have improved improvements seems to be quite uneven.  
Brakes have been placed on overtime work at the discretion of employers, more guarantees have 
backed up the system of employee leave and break time, social insurance and pension 
contributions by the employer have been enhanced, and workers have seen some improvement in 
working conditions and fringe benefits.11  While none of this is meant to claim that China’s 
industrial relations problems – much less its problems with freedom of speech and association – 
have been solved, they do represent concrete steps toward the development of a functioning 
industrial relations system appropriate for a market economy.  
It also is important to understand that the Chinese make changes one small step at a time.  
Rather than begin by passing a law and then determining whether the law achieved the intended 
result, as we do ideally in the west, the Chinese tend to experiment with practices that address 
perceived problems and use these experiments to test the practices that they later formalize in the 
law.  This use of experiments is particularly important for the development of labor law in 
particular and industrial relations generally in China (Gallagher 2005).  As suggested above, this 
is consistent with an inductive approach to the world that is very different than the deductive one 
that westerners use (Nisbett 2003). 
In July of 2005, Chaoyang District in Changchun, in the northeast province of Jilin, began 
an experiment to professionalize union presidents for small private enterprises, with the 
exploration and subsequent promotion of this concept by district Union Chairman Wang. The 
project began for the first time in Qinghe Street. Qinghe Street, which includes six communities, 
is a famous restaurant business district in Changchun employing tens of thousands of 
nongmingong, or peasant migrant workers.  Nongmingong are among the most exploited workers 
in China because they tend to have limited literacy and extremely limited urban skills, have a 
very limited understanding of their rights, and work in very low paid service sector and 
construction jobs. 
                                                
 
11 “Conditions on Collective Bargaining in China.”  Briefing paper provided to the authors during their visit with the 
Director-General of the Collective Contracts Department of the ACFTU on September 2, 2005. In Chinese. 
 The union structure in Changchun also plays an important role.  While the ACFTU and 
employees of member unions are government employees, the hierarchy to which they report is 
somewhat different from that of the rest of the government, creating a parallel chain-of-
command that may represent a countervailing power structure (Taylor, Chang Kai, and Li Qi 
2003).  At the province level, the union hierarchy extends down to the Basic Local Union for 
firms employing 25 or more workers and the United Local Union for firms employing fewer than 
25 workers. 
Figure 1. Structure of Jilin and Chaoyang Unions 
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 participate in union activities (Fifth Session of the Seventh National People's Congress and 24th 
Meeting of the Standing Committee of the Ninth National People's Congress 2004). The law has 
no specific guidance regarding whether the union can hire professionals as presidents. 
The Changchun City union hired six persons as union president candidates from among 150 
people who applied as the result of a local news story.  Once hired, their job was to organize 
enterprises and workers in a sector of firms employing fewer than 25 workers.  Their 
employment was provisional for two months after which they would be evaluated by the district 
level union, followed by an election procedure held by the Workers’ Congress in that District. 
The six selected union presidents were responsible for all the union organizing and worker 
protection work in Qinghe Street.  During their first year, from July 2005 to July 2006, these six 
union presidents organized 30,000 workers and their organizing efforts successfully recovered 
¥100,000 in unpaid salaries.  
In August of 2006, the provincial union recognized the success of the Qinghe experiment 
and decided to implement the same practice to the other streets of Chaoyang District. During 
2006, 16 persons were recruited and deployed to eight streets and one economic development 
zone to organize community unions.  They successfully organized unions throughout that area 
and were elected as presidents of Private Enterprise Union Confederations, in charge of union 
work for 16 blocks in Chaoyang District in which more than 2,000 small private enterprises are 
located. 
In April of 2007, the Jilin provincial union decided to apply the Chaoyang practice to the 
whole province.  Implementing the plan made by the provincial union in 2007, the medium-sized 
cities in the province have recruited 300 persons as professional union president candidates for 
private enterprises, and in 2008 and 2009, the union plans to recruit 150 more persons in small 
cities and towns.  On April 10, the ACFTU held a conference in Changchun to promote the 
Chaoyang Model throughout the whole nation.  
What is new about this model and what problem was it created to resolve? 
Union presidents had never before been hired and paid by the union outside the control of 
the firm. In the traditional system, union presidents develop inside the enterprise and are paid as 
employees by the work unit (danwei) for their work for the enterprise and for their union 
activities. In state-owned firms, the pay for the position of full-time president is equal to that of a 
 vice-director of the firm.  In privately owned firms, presidents usually serve on a part time basis, 
usually not receiving additional pay for their positions as presidents12. According to the Trade 
Union Law, in firms or work units employing more than 200 persons, full time presidents or the 
other union clerks can be constituted and will be paid by the firm or the work unit (Fifth Session 
of the Seventh National People's Congress and 24th Meeting of the Standing Committee of the 
Ninth National People's Congress 2004).  In these cases, presidents frequently are appointed by 
the boss or only take the union job as a part-time one in private enterprises. Because they are 
employed by the boss and to a substantial extent depend on the boss to make a living, it is very 
difficult for them to protect the workers’ rights in the private enterprises.  Moreover, it is very 
difficult to organize the workers into unions in the large number of small private enterprises that 
are increasing very rapidly with the development of privately owned enterprises. The union 
created this new model, which is somewhat similar to a western union hiring organizers, to try to 
solve these problems; these organizers, however, become like professional business agents in a 
western sense and are responsible for administering the labor-management relationship after they 
have completed their organizing task but do so subject to election by their constituents.  The 
union confederation that unites all the private enterprises in a certain block is created by the 
upper level union organization, and the president of it is recruited publicly and selected strictly 
based on the judgment of the union that the president is competent and independent from any 
private enterprise. 
What political arrangements govern the system? 
The Communist Party and the government support this new initiative because the ACFTU 
is led by the Party.  In order to execute the new model properly and get the support of the Party, 
union organizing is combined with the construction of the local Party Committee in the private 
enterprises.  Obviously this allows the CCP, which has become increasingly separated from the 
workers and the all-important danwei (Frazier 2002), to reconstruct its relationship with regular 
people as they move from the state-owned enterprises to privately owned ones. 
A good example came from a meeting held by President Gao on Oct. 24, 2007. The 
President of the Branch Union in a privately owned restaurant, who also serves as the Secretary 
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 of the Party Division there, helped outstanding employees of the restaurant to get medical 
insurance and social security. According to him, the activities of the union and Communist Party 
are making this private enterprise’s organizational atmosphere very good, and workers like to 
work hard because they are treated well by the enterprise and because they have developed a 
sense of belonging to the enterprise.  
Public recruitment is organized by the District Level of the Union (e.g. Chaoyang District) 
and the presidents are deployed to the street or block level union confederation as president 
candidates; their employment as union presidents becomes formalized only after their evaluation 
by the union and election by workers.  Their salary is paid by three parties – the provincial 
ACFTU, the Medium and Small Enterprises Bureau of Jilin Province, and city-level ACFTU. 
Benefits are paid by the District-level ACFTU.  The Street organization provides an office and 
bears the usual work expenses. Pay increases are regular but compensation is quite low. 
These Community Union presidents are evaluated according to the administrative measures 
made by the provincial union.  Presidents who implement their tasks and meet their organizing 
and representational targets, while serving both the needs of the workers and the development 
needs of the enterprises, receive public recognition and bonus compensation. Presidents who do 
not perform well and achieve less than a 60% satisfaction rate from the union members13 will be 
dismissed. 
The management of the system is under the direction of the Provincial and City Union, is 
implemented and organized by the District-level Union, and is administered directly by the 
Street-level Union.  The Private Enterprise Union Confederations are under the dual direction of 
the District Union and the Street Party Committee. The tasks of the Presidents of Confederations 
are to (1) lead and direct all the unions founded in the private enterprises covered by the 
Confederation, including union branches in enterprises of more than 25 employees and union 
groups in enterprises of fewer than 25 employees; (2) be responsible for union organizing in the 
enterprises in which no union has been set up; (3) coordinate the labor relations in the covered 
district and the covered industry; and (4) implement the functions of workers protection when 
necessary, including where the local unions are not functioning properly or where no union 
                                                
 
13 Membership satisfaction is determined by the Workers Representative Congress, which generally is held once a 
year but can be held any time when necessary if two-thirds of the members agree to call such a Congress. 
 exists. 
A big outstanding problem for all of the unions in China has been the fact that despite the 
fact that they are entitled to two percent of all compensation – remember that they perform both 
a representational and human resource function for the firm – they have been chronically under-
funded for many years (Gallagher 2005).  One reason why the Jilin union can afford to undertake 
this massive organizing and representation effort is that the province has agreed to assign 
responsibility for collection to the Tax Bureau.  Even when there is no a local union, the Tax 
Bureau will collect two percent of total pay as a union fee.  This money is used as a development 
fund for organizing unions when the Unions are in their organizing phase and used for 
administration once they have been organized.   
How have these unions responded to organizing challenges? 
Some of the private enterprises do not welcome these Presidents’ union organizing activities. 
A South Korean owner of one foreign-invested restaurant objected to it and said, “I don’t want to 
make myself that kind of trouble. When I once traveled to Europe, I met worker’s strike. It’s 
terrible.”   In these cases, the union must convince the company that the union will benefit the 
enterprise as well as the workers.  Unlike western unions, Chinese unions are responsible for 
both protecting workers and developing enterprises and need to develop consent of both labor 
and management.  Employees in the small private enterprises are usually young nongmingong, 
who do not understand what unions will do for them and only care about earning money if 
conditions allow. They are reluctant to participate in unions or do not want the Presidents to 
approach them. 
How do these Presidents organize their work? 
First, the Presidents in Chaoyang District are independent and professional, and not 
constrained by the old-style bureaucracy of the ACFTU.  Many of them are middle-aged workers 
from state-owned enterprises that have downsized and they do not belong to the traditional 
hierarchy of ACFTU. They do not just stay in the office like most of the ACFTU cadres but 
rather spend their time on the street, traveling from workplace to workplace on foot or by bicycle. 
Their “office”, therefore, is “flowing”. They move around to visit the private enterprises and go 
to talk with and help the workers. Every worker employed in private enterprises in Chaoyang 
District who holds a Worker Protection Green Card (union member card) can go to the President 
 for help. 
At the same time the Presidents work to protect workers’ rights, they serve the interests of 
the enterprises too. For example, one President of Qinghe Street Union Confederation in 
Chaoyang District made his own rule about how to serve the enterprises when at the same time 
protecting the workers; he called it the “Five Presences” (??场). 
1. The President has to be present when workers and their bosses have conflicts. 
2. The President must be present when issues of non-payment occur. 
3. The President must be there when workers get very sick. 
4. The President must be present when workers face difficult-to-resolve problems. 
5. The President must be on the scene when accidents happen in the enterprises and to 
take action to avoid occupational safety problems.  
The Presidents also have helped resolve human resource shortage problems.  In January of 
2006, union Presidents helped the enterprises to solve the labor shortage problem as Spring 
Festival approached – a common problem in China’s migrant economy. After Presidents 
discovered the shortage problem, they reported it to the Chaoyang District. They then united 
three town-level unions to recruit young nongmingong from the countryside. Nongmingong also 
trusted them more because as representatives of the Chaoyang District Union, workers could 
assure themselves that the recruiters were actually there to help them get legitimate jobs and not 
to trick them to take employment that might lead to an undesirable job or even slavery (French 
2007; Ni Ching-Ching 2007).  More than 170 nongmingong met with the employers, and mutual 
selection was done on the spot.  Presidents extracted a quid pro quo, however, as they also 
signed contracts with these enterprises to get them to promise not to let non-payment problems 
happen. This way they also protected the rights of workers and these nongmingong became 
union members. After this event, a network was set up to get to know the employment needs of 
the enterprises and keep contacts with the labor market in case shortages develop again. 
How do these union Presidents organize? 
The union Presidents’ style is as important as we would consider union organizers’ style in 
the west.  Presidents persuade the workers by telling them what they will get by participating in 
 the union, and at the same time persuade the owners by telling them the benefits they get by 
supporting the union’s establishment in their enterprise. Although union organization does not 
necessarily need the employers’ agreement according to the Union Law, peaceful ways are 
preferred since harmonious society is the goal.  
The first preference of these Presidents is to persuade the owners of the enterprises using 
soft ways to allow the unions to become organized.  For example, when meeting very strong 
resistance from an enterprise, a few Presidents joined together to invite the owner to drink tea 
together, persuading the owner with collective power (a tea house is an important meeting space 
in China and served the same purpose in Taiwan). Sometimes they wait for good timing to 
convert the owners’ thinking. For example, one owner who went on a business trip to Beijing for 
more than 20 days entrusted an employee — one new university graduate — to be in charge of 
the enterprise in his stead.  The union President made good use of this chance and cooperated 
with this employee to develop a Suggestion Box for the workers in this enterprise. When the 
owner returned he found that the workers had become very energetic and enthusiastic about the 
company. The owner changed his mind when his substitute manager told him that this new 
attitude was one of the benefits of the union organizing. 
To attract workers to become union members and also help them ease their living, 
discounted service functions are added to the Green Card, much like the Union Advantage Card 
in the U.S. Union members can enjoy discounted medical services, haircut service, or shower 
service just by showing their cards. Five hospitals have now agreed to provide 20% - 30% 
discounts on medical services to union members. Medical or health insurance, however, is 
beyond the reach of unions and workers at this level. 
In sum, what did union organizing achieve in Chaoyang District? 
The union tackled the problems of workers protection in the private enterprises.  The union 
identified itself as the institution that can really protect workers; it addressed workers’ fear of 
losing jobs if conflict arises with the boss; but it still is not capable of protecting workers if their 
human capital characteristics are insufficient. 
Between August 2005 and March of 2007, 30,000 union members in 1500 small private 
enterprises joined the union in Chaoyang District.   By the end of June 2007, in Chaoyang 
District unions had been established in nearly 97% of non-public companies and 98% of all 
 employees had joined the union. In addition, the two indicators mentioned above had been both 
100% in the smaller non-public companies employing fewer than 25 employees. 
The Community Union has begun to protect workers’ rights according to the Labor Law 
and Labor Contract Law.  The President of one of the leading Street Union Federations said the 
Labor Contract Law has already turned into a very good lever that the union has used to fight 
with recalcitrant owners. For example, between 2005 and 2007 President Gao recovered 
¥250,000 in unpaid workers’ compensation through negotiations with the employers; he also 
represented and filed lawsuits pro bono on behalf of workers who either could not afford lawyers 
or did not know how to file legal claims, recovering an additional ¥250,000 in lawsuits acting as 
the workers’ agent.14  This is ¥500,000 translates to US$71,271, which is a great deal of money 
for workers making ¥500-600, or US$70-85 per month).  He was able to do so because of his 
independence from the enterprises and also because of his knowledge of how to use the law to 
protect workers.  In another example, President Liu, in charge of Chongqing Street Union 
Confederation in Chaoyang District, once found three firms that were paying workers under the 
lawful lowest wage.15 President Liu negotiated with the bosses and got workers’ wages up to the 
minimum wage. He also took initiative to select 20 workers as the negotiating representatives to 
help him with the negotiations about all kinds of issues. In 2007, the union investigated 
compliance with the law requiring employers to sign labor contracts and found that the labor 
contract signing rate and pension security participation rate was 12% and 10% respectively in 
this district. These rates have risen to 60% and 30%, respectively, as a result of having 
professionalized the union presidents16.  The Community Union generally has been able to 
increase the welfare of many of the lowest-paid and most disadvantaged workers, such as 
obtaining workers’ compensation payments for injuries at work as well as improved food and 
lodging. 
The Community Union has lowered the turnover rate of workers.  Yuenan Restaurant, 
which originally was located in Qinghe Street but which now is relocated in Nanzhan Street the 
same Chaoyang District, provides a good example. The Union there helped to build cooperative 
labor relations, lowering the turnover rate from 30% (which is very usual in restaurant industry) 
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 to 10%.  Since the beginning of 2007, in the level of small private enterprises, union 
confederation tripartite consultation systems and procedures have been set up and improved step 
by step, standardizing the preparation process for starting the Workers’ Congress and the equal 
consultation procedure that develops the terms and conditions to include in collective contracts. 
In addition, the unions standardized the equal mediation process and the content of the mediation 
before signing the collective contracts. The rate of both building systems and signing collective 
contracts has reached 100%. 
Starting in 2007, the union researched issues involved in the Worker’s Congress at the level 
of the Union Confederation of Small Non-public Enterprises (i.e. a collective Worker’s Congress 
for private enterprise) as well as larger non-public enterprises that qualify to have basic unions. 
These issues include the form, procedure, and contents of this kind of Worker’s Congress. They 
summarized a series of flexible methods that are suitable to non-public companies. Actions were 
taken to create an open-door policy with respect to the company’s affairs, create a democratic 
style of merit appraisals in the company, and create a suggestion system adapted to small private 
enterprises, as appropriate, in an effort to introduce democratic management. The union hopes 
that will give workers some faith in democratic management. The union intends that this activity 
protect the workers’ democratic political rights, and workers can protect their own benefits 
through participating widely in management.  The union also intends that this activity arouse 
workers’ initiative and enthusiasm in participating in management, seeking to achieve 
development together with employers. Some of the unions in the sixteen-union confederation of 
non-public companies in Chaoyang District held a Workers Congress in September of 2007 and 
signed collective contracts at the level of the union confederation. The Workers Congress 
activity will be promoted in the companies that have more than 25 workers, aiming at enlarging 
the coverage of democratic management in non-public companies, and attempting to make all 
these companies have democratic management by the end of 2008. During the conclusion of the 
Employees’ Representative Congress, a regular system for checking up on the status of 
democratic management in these firms began. At the request of the Workers Congress, worker 
representatives were designated and authorized to supervise and check regularly to ensure that 
the suggestions and comments issued by the Workers’ Congress and from the worker 
representatives have been dealt with seriously and implemented properly, and if they find 
problems they will report them to the upper level union. 
 With all this success, the Community Union still faces some challenges.  The qualities of 
the people – dedication, enthusiasm, integrity, and commitment to improving the working and 
living conditions of migrant peasant workers – is a crucial variable.  Great people can use these 
institutions to achieve success, while less inspired people who do not put forward the effort tend 
to be less successful.  Controlling for these individual factors, however, the professional 
presidents in all districts appear to be performing better than did some of the traditional union 
people in their hierarchies17.  The enthusiasm and capabilities of the Chaoyang district staff have 
been critical factor making this model successful. The biggest challenge they now face is trying 
to organize collective negotiations among these small firms, which would be the basis for 
collective contracts.  Salaries remain low, particularly in view of their responsibilities and 
workload.  
Conclusion 
Chinese industrial relations is important to US workers employed by industries that compete 
with the Chinese, including US-based automobile manufacturers and US-based industries that 
subcontract to China for parts and components.  While China’s currency and environmental 
policies contribute to their trade advantage, China’s biggest advantage stems from differences 
between China’s labor policy and that of the United States and the developed world – policies 
that allow Chinese firms or China-based production enterprises to compete based on low-cost 
labor.  The domestic competition within China for business within the prevailing liberal 
regulatory framework – including free trade – has spawned the development of sweatshops that 
exacerbate the trade gap. 
While China’s unions have been established in enterprises that as of September 20, 2007, 
employed more than 169.94 million workers, 24.1% of whom are nongmingong, in more than 
1.324 million primary trade union organizations in 2.753 million enterprises and institutions18, 
industrial relations seems to be on the cusp of change between the transmission-belt model, in 
which the Communist Party used the trade unions to advocate the Party’s mission (Baek Seung 
Wook 2000), and an uncertain but potentially promising future role.  The old model is a heritage 
                                                
 
17 Interview with official of the Federation of Labor Union of Jilin Province. 
18 http://www.acftu.org.cn/, accessed on April 15, 2007. 
 both of the role of the trade union movement in earlier stages of the Chinese revolution (going 
back to the general “nationalist” era before the open conflict between the Chinese Communist 
Party and the Kuomintang [or Guomindang; People’s Party]19) and of the role of the trade unions 
in China since 1949.  Many scholars and officials would like to see the ACFTU transformed into 
a more independent organization for worker interest representation (Taylor 2000), but 
insufficient understanding of the process and consequences of such a change holds them back.  
Recent developments provide evidence of their serious interest in modifying employment and 
labor law, but modification has developed incrementally to avoid social and political 
destabilization. 
The other dimension we see is the transformation of the union.  Even though from a macro 
perspective the trade union itself is still under the control of the CCP, efforts such as these to 
seek alternative approaches that re-orient the trade union movement under a market based 
economy are taking place with the full support of the CCP. We can see from secondary sources 
that the union is struggling to reorient its function to become an authentic representative of 
workers in a market economy and is doing so in cooperation with the CCP.  Interviews with 
union organizers who are organizing workers in workplaces with less than 25 employees show 
that new forms of community-based unions are stepping into the representational void created by 
the development of small companies where organizing and representation has always been 
difficult.  An initiative not permitted by the Trade Union Law, they have recruited outsiders – 
most of them retired public servants and even retired private firms managers – as organizers and 
hired the “community union” president 20 on a temporary basis; the hired union president must 
stand for election in two months if he is to remain in office.  They argue that although the Trade 
Union Law requires that union leadership be elected from among the membership, employees of 
these small firms cannot deal with the employers directly and hence cannot organize themselves 
on their own.  For this reason, the district union has begun organizing employees in these small 
companies, facilitating the union’s daily business by providing them with a union president who 
is paid by the provincial union, the Provincial Medium-Small Enterprises Bureau (a government 
institution in charge of development of medium-small private enterprises) and the District-level 
                                                
 
19 The meaning of Kuomintang in Chinese literally is the “Party of the People of the Nation.” 
20 A “community” can be an office building or a business neighborhood, a district, a street, or some other entity in 
which the small firms with fewer than 25 employees gather..  
 government.  In this case, the union claims that it is helping the community-based union achieve 
its voice on labor relations issues.  
Whether the Workers’ Congress can perform its function actually depends on the capacity 
of the trade union at different firms. Clearly at top-tier firms, the workers’ congress can perform 
its function because the institutional legacy maintains the influence of the Party workers’ voice. 
At lower-tier firms, while the workers congress structure may still exist, the function is 
dwindling.   This trend demonstrates the challenge that worker interest representation faces as 
China’s market revolution continues. 
  
Figure 1: 1999 Industrial Enterprises by Ownership Structure (in hundreds)
Source: China Statistical Yearbook, National Bureau of Statistics
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 Figure 2: Fractional Change in Number of Enterprises by Structural Form, 1994-1999
Source: China Statistical Yearbook, National Bureau of Statistics
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